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Executive Summary 
 
As the UK begins to leave the European Union, it heralds a period of significant uncertainty 
for environmental governance. In few sectors are the potential impacts as profound as in waste 
and resources, where forty years of EU action have helped transform waste treatment in the 
UK from landfill-based disposal towards greater recycling and tighter environmental controls. 
 
The aim of this briefing report is to spark debate about the potential effects of Brexit on future 
policy directions in the UK waste and resources management sector. It seeks to move beyond 
the simplistic categories of ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ Brexit, to foster more considered reflection on the 
potential policy pathways arising from leaving the EU, and the factors that could shape their 
emergence. 
 
Potential change has multiple dimensions. There is the legislative dimension, recognising that 
‘EU policy’ for waste and resources embraces a wide range of activities, some connected to 
trade some less so, which may be affected differently by the UK’s renegotiated relationship 
with the EU. Cutting across this is the territorial dimension, especially devolution, raising 
questions about the spatial reach and consistency of future waste policy. Arguably most 
important is the substantive dimension: how should environmental and economic concerns be 
reconciled in the setting of policy goals?  
 
Just because the future is uncertain does not mean that future policy will be written on a blank 
sheet of paper. Actors already in place and the narratives already circulating are likely to affect 
future policy. In terms of actors, government at UK, devolved and local levels is very important, 
with the waste-related responsibilities of local government already being delivered in the 
shadow of austerity. Corporate actors in the waste and resources sector could be a force for 
continuity, with infrastructure to sustain and contracts to uphold. Surrounding these parties are 
a more diffuse set of actors: businesses that may be encompassed within moves for ‘producer 
responsibility’ for waste, NGOs and the wider public. 
 
In terms of narratives for change, two main arguments have been in circulation leading up to 
the Brexit process. There is pressure to further develop the ‘circular economy’, centred on 
adoption of the EU’s Circular Economy Package (CEP) of legislation and other measures, 
pushing towards further reductions in landfill, increases in recycling rates, and designing out 
waste. Set in potential opposition are narratives representing Brexit as an opportunity for 
deregulation, with the CEP proposals argued to be too expensive, unachievable, and 
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benefiting from replacement by measures better supporting domestic economic 
competitiveness.  
 
The briefing sets down three post-Brexit waste and resources policy scenarios: 
 
A) Tracking the EU 
This scenario assumes that once the ‘leave’ process is complete UK waste and resources 
policy continues to track closely that of the EU, including those in the CEP. This scenario will 
be reinforced should the CEP measures become transposed into UK law while Brexit is 
negotiated, but other factors would also support it, i.e. where strong advantages to trade are 
identified from the UK remaining compatible with EU standards. Working against this scenario 
is that the UK will lose scope to influence the future development of EU policy, and there are 
critics of the economic viability and desirability of following the direction of the EU. 
 
B) Flatlining, fragmentation and regression 
This scenario takes on concerns that Brexit will herald a period of limited and declining 
ambition in UK environmental policy and considers how they might unfold for waste. 
Reinforcing this prospect are: deregulatory arguments challenging the costs of CEP-type 
measures and fostering a disinclination to mandate extended producer responsibility for 
waste: a future in which central government interest in waste policy is limited, shifting more 
responsibility to local authorities but with fewer resources. Working against this scenario are 
pressures for cross-national regulatory consistency emanating from intra-EU waste-related 
trade or international movement. Various factors militate against a major return to landfill, but 
domestic incineration/energy-from-waste may be boosted as a convenient solution to disposal 
problems. 
 
C) Diverse green shoots 
Here Brexit is a catalyst for new waste and resource policies that take UK practice further ‘up’ 
the waste hierarchy, possibly beyond the goals of the CEP. One factor reinforcing it would be 
the intensification of ‘national resource security’ narratives, arguing that UK economic 
competitiveness needs a high quality circular economy operating within national borders, 
though it faces challenges based on costs and conflict with the idea of a post-Brexit UK 
becoming a ‘beacon for global free trade’. Public and NGO pressure for better waste 
management will be important, as seen around types of plastic waste. Devolution may also 
reinforce this scenario, in that the devolved governments of Wales and Scotland have used 
their powers in the waste field to outperform England. Key questions concern the governance 
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mechanisms or economic leverage by which devolved government practices ‘bid up’ policy in 
England. 
 
The scenarios are not predictions, but they push us to confront important issues facing waste 
and resources policy, post-Brexit. The analysis has sought to open up the multiple dimensions 
of change, and highlight that understanding persistence can be equally useful. Across our 
scenarios, three more fundamental questions emerge as deserving of attention: 
 
 What is the public value of regulation? Deregulatory pressures surround the Brexit 
process but economic opportunity in the waste sector is defined by government action. 
 Does voluntary business action take us to sustainability? This question is especially 
relevant to extended producer responsibility.  
 Territorial coordination – but with whom, how, and at what level? Given devolution, the 
issue of how best to reconcile environment and economy has a territorial, political 
dimension. 
  
1 
1.0 Introduction 
 
On June 23rd, 2016, the British public voted to leave the European Union (EU), thus triggering 
a period of unprecedented uncertainty for the way that environmental problems are governed 
in the UK. In few areas of environmental policy could the potential changes be as profound as 
waste. Since the EU’s first interventions in this field in the 1970s, the management of waste 
in the UK has been transformed: as an accumulation of legislation and policy helped to drive 
the reduced use of landfill, tighter environmental protections for handling various categories 
of waste, and promote re-use of the resource content. In particular , EU legislation has helped 
to institute the idea of a waste ‘hierarchy’ (EC, 1975, EC, 2008) in which disposal by landfill is 
to be minimised in favour of solutions higher up the hierarchy (see Figure 1). More widely, the 
field of ‘waste disposal’, an end-of-the-pipe activity, has been reformulated as a more multi-
dimensional field of resources management. 
 
 
Figure 1: The EU’s Approach to the Waste Hierarchy (EC, 2008) 
 
 
EU membership is also seen as combining the prospects of continued improvements in waste 
management policy with relative stability and consistency in institutional arrangements, within 
the UK and beyond. As the UK Government begins the ‘Brexit’ process, all this seems under 
threat and many in the waste sector have been anxious at the prospect (Jennings, 2016, 
Messenger, 2016, Moore, 2016). 
 
 
source: WTERT (2017) 
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This briefing report aims to spark debate about the potential effects of Brexit on future policy 
directions in the waste and resources management sector in the UK.1 It responds to the 
paucity of consideration given to environmental issues generally in the run-up and aftermath 
of the EU referendum (and the June 2017 General Election, Jordan and Gravey, 2017), and 
to the often simplistic way in which debate is conducted. Most debate about the UK’s post-
Brexit future has been dominated by three scenarios, characterised as: i) a ‘hard Brexit’ where 
the UK loses access to the Single Market, ii) a ‘soft Brexit’ where the UK stays within the 
European Economic Area (EEA), and iii) an ‘à la carte Brexit’ where bilateral agreements 
would dominate future trade relations between the UK, Europe and the wider world (which is 
considered unpalatable to the EU, see Simon, 2016, Filgueria, 2016). This apparently neat set 
of choices has informed an often polarised political debate as to whether Brexit is wholly good 
or wholly bad. There is a need to foster more careful thinking about the array of potential policy 
pathways for waste policy arising from leaving the EU, and the conditions that are likely to 
shape which pathways actually emerge. 
 
This briefing has four further sections. 
 
Section 2 identifies the multiple dimensions of change that might unfold: legislative 
dimensions (the array of EU legislation affected), territorial dimensions (especially devolution), 
and substantive dimensions (what goals are pursued?). When change is considered as multi-
dimensional, it becomes clearer that there is a complex array of policy pathways and directions 
of change. 
 
While Brexit is often presented as an opportunity to think afresh about possible policy 
directions for the UK, in waste - as in many other areas – it is important to recognise that there 
are strong pressures for continuity. Thus, Section 3 examines the key actors already heavily 
engaged in the waste sector, the key narratives used to justify or critique current policy 
trajectories, and the various other factors that tend to reinforce present approaches to 
managing waste. This enables reflection not just on whether particular future pathways for UK 
waste policy are desirable, but also which are more likely and why. 
 
                                                          
1 We draw upon the ESRC-funded research project UK Environmental Governance Post-Brexit: What 
Will Happen to Waste? supported under the Cardiff University Impact Acceleration scheme. It has 
been conducted by researchers at the School of Geography and Planning, and involved documentary 
analysis and sixteen interviews with actors involved in waste and resources management. 
Interviewees are treated anonymously, cited in this document only by category of actor and date of 
interview. 
3 
 
This informs the approach taken in Section 4, where we outline scenarios for the future. 
Scenario A, ‘Tracking the EU’, involves seeking to align UK policy around EU-compatible 
objectives for waste, including the adoption of the Circular Economy Package of measures. 
Benchmarked against this, we consider two sets of variations. In Scenario B, ‘Flatlining, 
Fragmentation or Regression’, the governance of waste in the UK falters post-Brexit, and 
shows little overall movement of waste handling ‘up’ the waste hierarchy. In Scenario C, 
‘Diverse Green Shoots’, the governance of waste in the UK, post-Brexit, takes new steps to 
improve environmental performance. For all three scenarios, we consider the factors that 
would influence their appearance, reinforce them, as well as factors militating against their 
emergence. 
 
The rationale for creating these scenarios is not to predict the future, but to provide a 
framework for thinking about the diversity of possible scenarios. They also seek to extend 
thinking beyond hypothetically possible post-Brexit worlds, to highlight the factors that may 
‘lock in’ policy development around particular paths (Unruh, 2000) and the tensions that could 
create instability. Section 5 offers points of conclusion and sets out questions around which 
further feedback would be welcome (address given at end). 
 
 
2.0 UK Waste Management - Key Dimensions of the Policy Landscape 
 
In order to understand how the governance of waste and waste-related resources may 
develop in the UK after Brexit, we offer an outline of the different dimensions of the policy field, 
and how they intersect with the regulations and actions of the EU. These dimensions are 
organised into the following categories: 
 
 legislative dimensions, referring to the different elements of EU-related policy applicable 
to the UK that might now become open to change, 
 territorial dimensions, referring to the spatial scales at which waste and resources 
governance are and could be organised, and 
 substantive dimensions, referring to the different perspectives on how environmental 
and economic goals should be integrated. 
 
Thinking about these dimensions makes it clearer that the waste and resources policy 
landscape is complex and, by considering different combinations of these dimensions, that 
there are multiple potential future pathways of change. It also provides a framework for 
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evaluating the proposals for change currently being put forward by actors in the political, waste 
and environmental fields. Such proposals may give central and explicit emphasis to certain 
dimensions of change but may be silent about others despite potentially having profound 
implications for them. The partiality of various proposals – what is included and what is omitted 
– also becomes clearer. 
 
 
2.1 Legislative Dimensions 
 
Table 1 shows key elements of some of the 600 or so European policies and regulations which 
impact on the operation of UK waste and resource management (Interview, Listed Company 
1, 15.3.17), from which a number of points can be taken. 
 
Most immediately, it shows the breadth of coverage of EU-based policy and regulation, 
encompassing broad targets for disposal routes, procedural requirements and specific 
provisions for particular types of waste.2 It is through this far-reaching set of interventions that 
the EU has sought – with some success – to push the handling of waste in Member States 
‘up’ the waste hierarchy, away from landfill, towards forms of resource recovery and to 
encourage waste avoidance. In legislative terms, should the UK re-join the European 
Economic Area (EEA) then legal experts anticipate that the UK would need to still comply with 
the vast majority of these policies and regulations, as well as any future changes made by the 
EU, albeit with much less scope to influence their direction of change. If the UK’s Brexit 
arrangements entail not being members of the single market – which is the UK Government’s 
strategy at present (CUP, 2017) - then the policies and regulations applying to the UK become 
subject potentially to greater change. 
 
Table 1 also shows that EU policies seek to govern waste in diverse ways. Some pertain to 
practices such as target-setting within Member States (e.g. for recycling), to which a post-
Brexit UK outside the EEA might not need to comply. Others pertain to the standards that 
need to be met by materials that are tradable within and beyond the European Union, and 
would presumably still apply to UK organisations seeking to move waste and waste-derived 
products to/from the EU. Whichever Brexit route is chosen, it remains the case that regulation 
and markets intersect. Policy that seeks to regulate how waste hazards are handled can also 
have great implications for resource markets – the scope for and terms on which waste and 
                                                          
2 We have not sought to be exhaustive. For example, there is no space to address the significant 
implications of Brexit for the governance of nuclear materials, which is caught up in the fate of the 
Euratom Treaty. 
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waste-derived resources can move around within or beyond what has been termed the EU’s 
‘Schengen Area for Waste’ (Kama, 2015, 19).  
 
Table 1 also shows how aspects of EU policy build on international conventions and 
obligations e.g. the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. Thus, commentators have argued that, even outside 
the EU, the fact that the UK has ratified numerous international treaties means many 
environmental protection obligations will remain (see Macrory, 2017). However, international 
conventions are often simpler, less precise and, unlike EU legislation, most lack mechanisms 
for enforcing compliance and redress (HoL-EUC, 2017), whereas for EU policy national 
governments can be held to account through the European Commission and Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). 
 
Leaving the EU has other cross-cutting implications for UK waste and resources governance. 
At present, the CJEU has an important role securing compliance with the Aarhus Convention.3 
CJEU decisions have underscored the standing of environmental organisations in 
representing legitimate public interests and pressed the UK government on improving financial 
protection for those bringing environmental cases before the courts (Maurici and Moules, 
2014), in the face of UK governments pushing deregulation agendas that diminish procedural 
rights (Cowell, 2017). Exit from the EU may also mean a loss of access to EU funding for 
projects that can support the delivery of waste policy. 
 
 
2.2 Territorial Dimensions 
 
Concerns about space and territory are integral to governance of waste and resources in 
Europe (cf. Bulkeley et al., 2005). As noted above, EU policy in the sphere has co-evolved 
with the formation of markets, by working to create common waste-related standards across 
member states, producing a level playing field and thereby allowing waste- and waste-derived 
resources to move across borders. This has allowed companies to exploit market opportunities 
in other member states, for example, exporting waste-related products like refuse-derived fuel 
(RDF) (Kama, 2015). Spatial dimensions of governance also inform concepts like the 
‘proximity principle’, designed to inculcate ideas of responsibility and control risk, and also 
permeate international agreements that regulate longer-distance 
                                                          
3The UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making Access and 
Justice in Environmental Matters 
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Table 1: Key Features of Selected EU/UN Legislation for UK Wastes Management Sector (by date) 
Relevant Legislation / Regulation / Convention / Institution Wastes Management Parameter 
Waste Framework Directive 75/442/EEC Introduce the waste hierarchy into European waste policy and emphasize the 
importance of waste minimization, the protection of the environment and human 
health. 
Sewage Sludge Directive 86/278/EEC Encourage the use of sewage sludge in agriculture and to regulate its use in such 
a way as to prevent harmful effects on soil, vegetation, animals and man. 
Batteries Directive 91/157/EEC, Batteries Directive 2006/66/EC Minimise the negative impact of batteries and accumulators and harmonise their 
market requirements. 
Waste Shipment Regulations 259/93/EEC, Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006 (UN’s Basel 
Convention). 
The Proximity Principle and shipments of hazardous waste. 
Directives 94/62/EC &94/137/EEC on Packaging and Packaging Waste, Directive 
2004/12/EC, Directive 2005/20/EC, Ecodesign Directive 2009/125/EC, Regulation (EC) 
No 219/2009, Commission Directive 2013/2/EU, Directive (EU) 2015/720 
Reducing Upstream Waste 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) EEC/96/61, Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control Directive (EC, 2008), Environmental Impact Directive 
2011/92/EU 
Using Impact Assessments to Mitigate the Impact of Future Waste Activity 
Directive 96/59/EC, Regulation (EC) No 850/2004 on persistent organic pollutants Safe disposal of Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and polychlorinated terphenyls 
(PCTs)s 
UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) 
Grants the public rights regarding access to information, public participation and 
access to justice. 
Landfill Directive 99/31/EC Avoiding Landfilling 
The Protocol to the regional UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (CLRTAP) (2003), The global Stockholm Convention on POPs, Regulation 
(EC) No 850/2004 on persistent organic pollutants 
Reducing the negative impact of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
End of Life Vehicles Directive 2000/53/EC Increasing Recovery, Reuse and Recycling from Used Vehicles 
Waste Incineration Directive (WID) 2000/76/EC, Industrial Emissions Directive 
2010/75/EU, Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation & Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH) 1907/2006 
Reducing Environmental and Human Health Risks from Waste Activity 
Ozone Depleting Regulations 2037/2000 Reducing Ozone Depletion from Waste Activity 
Referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Enforcement 
WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC, WEEE Directive 2012/19/EU Recovery of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) 
RoHS Directive 2002/95/EC, RoHS recast Directive 2011/65/EU Restricting the use of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment 
Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC Recycling, reuse and/or reclamation. Conservation of natural resources. Promotion 
of energy efficiency via Energy-from-Waste (EfW). Reduce non-hazardous 
construction and demolition waste. Restricting hazardous waste shipment. 
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Table 2: Matrix for Legislation, Territory and Substantive Aims in the UK Wastes Management Sector 
 EU Level UK Level 
England Wales Scotland 
Directives, 
Statutes 
and 
Guidance 
Landfill Directive99/31/EC(EC, 1999) Landfill, England and Wales, Regulations (OPSI, 2002). 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010 
(OPSI, 2010) 
Landfill (Scotland) Regulations 
2003 (OPSI, 2003) 
Environmental Permitting Guidance - 
The Landfill Directive (DEFRA, 2011) 
Wise About Waste (WAG, 
2002) 
Waste Framework Directive 
2006/12/EC / Waste Framework 
Directive (Amended) 2008/98/EC (EC, 
2008) 
Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011 (OPSI, 2011) 
Waste (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 (OPSI, 
2012) 
Guide to Waste Management 
Licensing (SEPA, 2009) 
Waste (Scotland) Regulations 
2012 (SG, 2012) 
Waste Management Plan for England 
(DEFRA, 2013) 
Towards Zero Waste (WG, 
2010) 
Zero Waste Management Plan 
for Scotland (SG, 2012) 
Circular Economy Package– amending 
Directives (pending) 
Uncertainty 
Aims Landfill Directive: Encourage 
downstream resource recovery and 
recycling. Marketise waste streams. 
Comply with Landfill Directive targets Exceed Landfill Directive targets 
Waste Framework Directive: Provide a 
definition of waste and revise and 
strengthen the waste hierarchy 
framework. 
Comply with Waste Framework Directive 
targets 
Exceed Waste Framework Directive targets 
Circular Economy Package: 
Encourage upstream activity to reduce 
waste production. 
Uncertainty 
Responsible 
Actors 
 
Directorate-General (DG) Environment & 
European Environment Agency (EEA) 
Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS), Environment Agency (EA), WRAP 
Environment and Countryside 
(Welsh Government), Natural 
Resources Wales (NRW), 
WRAP Cymru 
Environment, Climate Change 
and Land Reform (Scottish 
Government), Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(SEPA), WRAP 
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transfers (Sora, 2013). 
 
But Brexit itself is also fundamentally a territorial issue in that it is propelled by constituencies 
in the UK that regard supra-national government like the EU as an undesirable infringement 
on Parliamentary sovereignty, and seek to reassert the primacy of national interests. Such 
pressures could encourage greater national autarky in waste and resources management 
policy, with implications for markets operating at EU-scale. The territorial dimensions of policy 
can be contested. Even if different actors subscribe to the idea of a ‘circular economy’, they 
may not necessarily share the same views of the territory within which this circularity should 
be constructed, or of the legitimacy of ‘leakage’ of waste and related resources beyond that 
space (Kama, 2015, Gregson et al., 2015). 
 
Numerous questions arise. To what extent is consistency across space important? At what 
scale should governance processes operate, for which aspects of waste, and by what 
procedures should policy be agreed? Devolution is pivotal here. Within the UK, the allocation 
of environmental powers to the devolved nations has allowed some divergence of policy and 
practice in the waste sector between the four constituent territories of the UK, with EU policy 
providing an overarching framework. In Northern Ireland the permeability of the border with 
the Republic has facilitated large-scale waste movements between the nations. Wales has 
witnessed particular success in reaching a national 62% recycling rate compared to England’s 
42% (Resource, 2017). Welsh and Scottish governments have expressed concern that Brexit 
might throw devolution into reverse should Westminster efforts to construct the UK as a “great, 
global trading nation include more assertive intra-UK regulatory consistency. Such territorial 
dimensions of Brexit need considering in relation to the different legislative dimensions of 
waste policy discussed above. It may be regarded as permissible that devolution leads to 
divergence around target setting, but not concerning the standards and waste definitions that 
allow materials to be traded at a wider scale. 
 
 
2.3 Substantive Dimensions - Environmental and Economic 
 
Much of the discussion about Brexit has been dominated by legal and political discussion of 
powers, e.g. who controls what at what scale? (Filgueria, 2016, Gee and Young, 2016, Hunt 
et al., 2016). This can eclipse the question of towards what goals should waste and resources 
policy be directed? Should Brexit leave UK governments less beholden to EU objectives, so 
fundamental questions about goals become more up for discussion (Burns et al., 2016). A key 
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axis is how balances are struck between environmental and economic concerns, for which 
goal setting can be conceptualised in three broad ways: 
 
1) Ecologically-driven goals emphasise the need to govern waste and resources in ways 
that progressively diminish the impact on the environment (in terms of reduced 
consumption of resources, of the energy or water needed to process them, or the use of 
land/water/air as waste sinks). Advocates often argue that such impacts should be reduced 
as low as possible, reinforced by strong concerns for the precautionary principle (i.e. low 
tolerance of environmental risks), for designing out waste, and for handing future 
generations a robust stock of ‘environmental capital’. Goal-setting may focus on physical 
fluxes of materials and energy rather than flows of money, being characterised by setting 
progressively tighter goals for reducing certain kinds of activity e.g. for reducing disposal of 
waste to landfill. 
 
2) Eco-efficiency driven goals emphasise that the balance between environmental goals 
and economic objectives should be ‘optimal’ in some sense, by recognising that adverse 
environmental impacts have costs but so too do the various approaches to managing them. 
Advocates may be sceptical about goals seen as specifying ‘means’ (e.g. recycling) rather 
than ends, arguing that they risk funds being allocated sub-optimally. In some formulations, 
consideration of what is economically optimal is deemed an appropriate way of identifying 
policy goals (‘ends’); in others, markets are emphasised as means for efficiently achieving 
ends that are based on other knowledge (e.g. science). Linked to these positions is a faith 
in markets and in the scope to monetise costs and benefits to help determine policy 
solutions. 
 
3) Short-term economic-driven goals emphasise private profits and the reduction of 
costs to public and private sectors in the short-term, and challenge interventions that 
interfere with either of these goals. In various libertarian formulations, such perspectives 
may be opposed to government intervention in private affairs per se. Justifications of such 
positions also often entails downplaying environmental risks and/or playing up any 
uncertainty in knowledge about environmental risks. 
 
Cutting across these ideal types, it is important also to note that as well as environmental 
objectives and targets, the waste sector also requires infrastructure investments to deliver on 
those objectives. It is thus perfectly conceivable for industry bodies to advocate that the kind 
of infrastructure investment required to meet (more ambitious) environmental outcome targets 
for waste management – such as energy-from-waste or recyclate-processing facilities - 
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requires more flexibility in other rules governing the environmental impacts of those 
investments (see ESA, 2017). Whether such investments materialise may of course depend 
on the wider state of the economy, post-Brexit. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
Overall, one can see the diverse array of potential intersections between legislative, territorial 
and substantive dimensions of change. Table 2 above displays the potential complexity of 
post-Brexit policy change for a small section of waste and resources legislation. Policy aims 
are set against the legislative tiers involved (from the EU to the UK nations). The grey areas, 
however, show the current areas of policy uncertainty regarding pending EU legislation under 
the Circular Economy Package. As the next sections explain, one can also begin to discern 
how prospective post-Brexit pathways may combine contradictory positions. 
 
 
3.0 Drivers for Change: Actors and Narratives 
 
The path through Brexit and beyond is routinely presented as one of profound uncertainty and 
risk but also of opportunity, especially to develop new, ‘more UK sensitive’ approaches to 
public policy. Acknowledging this does not mean, however, that the Brexit process marks a 
straightforward breakpoint in waste management history, or that the UK faces a future policy 
world of infinite choice to be inscribed onto a blank sheet of paper. An alternative perspective 
is to acknowledge key elements shaping possible futures that are already in place. Analysts 
of the way that societies ‘transition’ to sustainability might go further, and question whether 
Brexit, of itself, would or should affect the ‘lock in’ to particular waste management pathways 
(see Corvellec et al., 2013, Unruh, 2000). One element is the likely persistence of the policy 
and regulatory institutions discussed above. Two others are the actors involved and key 
narratives for change already in circulation, considered in turn below. 
 
 
3.1 Actors in the waste and resources sector 
 
The waste and related resources sectors are constituted by a diverse set of actors, which one 
should expect to be impacted by the Brexit process in different ways. 
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There are government actors with roles in the governance of waste at all tiers of the political 
system, from EU to national, national-devolved and local-government level. Such hierarchical 
tiering, however, obscures the fact that there can be immense variations at any given level in 
terms of the approach to waste. As noted above, the devolved governments of Wales and 
Scotland have used their powers over aspects of waste policy to pursue higher targets for 
recycling than national norms. Meanwhile, the Westminster government, responsible for waste 
strategy in England, has been criticised for doing little since 2010 to set any strategic direction. 
It is at local government level that contracts for the collection, recovery and disposal of certain 
kinds of waste are arranged and planning approval for waste management facilities is given. 
‘Average recycling rates’ belie huge variations between authorities. 
 
Across the public sector, coping with austerity remains a significant issue, especially for local 
authorities, though with divergent implications for waste and responses to Brexit. Some local 
authorities have pushed up recycling rates to a level that enables reduced collections of 
residual waste such that moving out of landfill becomes cost effective (Interview, Sustainability 
Consultant 1, 13.3.17). Others, as outlined below, may see Brexit precisely as an opportunity 
for loosening target-based controls to shift money from waste to other pressing local policy 
areas. 
 
Corporate actors are critically important but fall into two broad sets. The first set is those 
businesses that derive income from the collection, management and sale/disposal of waste, 
a sector that includes major national and, increasingly international organisations. For such 
actors, Brexit is not necessarily the major challenge to their operations though it is a potentially 
destabilising factor. Waste policy uncertainty in England was already an issue, to which the 
EU referendum and its aftermath simply adds another layer. 
 
More significant for many has been the economic situation around the sector which, with the 
policy vacuum in England, creates a difficult context for investment (Interview Financial 
Investor 7.3.17; Interview, Listed Company 15.3.17). The effects of the economic downturn 
between 2008 and 2013 included a decrease in the amount of waste to be managed, resulting 
in lower gate fees that can be charged for managing that waste (Dick et al., 2016, Howard and 
Galloway, 2017) causing a financial contraction. The 2008 crash also precipitated reduced 
council spending, as above, and a wider downturn in commodity prices that in turn damaged 
markets for recyclates because it reduced the costs of raw material-based alternatives (e.g. 
oil as a feedstock for plastic).  
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Corporate actors in the waste and resources sector and their assets can be a force for 
continuity in management practices. They operate infrastructure – incinerators, collection and 
recovery plants – that require flows of input and output material to maintain viability. Sunk 
infrastructure can itself greatly structure the scope for change in the waste sector (Corvellec 
et al., 2013), such as the availability and cost of incineration capacity and the remaining 
availability of landfill. Also ‘bridging to the future’ through the Brexit process are contracts, for 
example to export RDF to continental Europe (Holder, 2016). 
 
The second set of corporate actors is more diffuse and their goals harder to map. It is the 
myriad businesses, manufacturers and retailers whose activities may generate waste and who 
need to be engaged in thinking about how their waste arisings can be reduced or managed if 
stricter environmental targets are to be addressed. This is the agenda of ‘producer 
responsibility’. Some businesses may see opportunities to attach value to waste management 
solutions like waste take-back because they exemplify corporate social responsibility, 
generate reputational gains and secure control over a stream of resources. Others may be 
inclined to view waste management as a cost that they would seek to minimise, with Brexit 
perhaps providing an opportunity to persist with convenient disposal-based solutions. 
 
Environmental non-governmental organisations are also important actors, and can be 
expected to make waste and resources policy the subject of campaigns, albeit likely to focus 
on aspects where particular problems have been identified (e.g. disposable coffee cups, 
plastics in marine environments). There are also various think tanks, for which one might argue 
that those on the right and centre-right of the political spectrum have become more visible 
since 2010. Key players in policy debates in previous decades but now absent, are the voices 
of the independent science-based bodies like the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (abolished) and watchdogs like the Sustainable Development Commission (ditto). 
 
Publics are also important actors, as prospective co-producers of more sustainable waste 
management outcomes (e.g. sorting recycling, returning packaging), in responding to planning 
applications for new waste management facilities (e.g. for new incinerators), and – along with 
businesses – as actors that may be tempted to act in ways that encourage the illegal disposal 
of waste. 
 
By looking at the actors involved, one can see how Brexit potentially affects the governance 
context in which waste management policy across the UK evolves, but not necessarily the 
immediate priorities or interests of all the actors. So rather than seeing Brexit as driving 
change, much depends on how the scope for policy change created by Brexit is exploited by 
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different actors. Indeed, historically, shifts in market activity and technological innovations by 
private companies have shaped waste legislation, not just policy (Interview, Listed Company 
1, 15.3.17, Interview, Listed Company 2, 24.3.17).  
 
 
3.2 Narratives of change 
 
In thinking about whether or how waste policy might change as the UK emerges from EU 
membership, it is reasonable to assume that arguments already in circulation will be brought 
to bear. Two are discussed here: 
 
EU-led narratives for a circular economy 
EU policy will continue to change and evolve alongside the Brexit negotiations and, for the 
waste sector, the main subject here is the final stages of agreeing ‘The Circular Economy 
Package’. 
 
Circular economies can be characterised as promoting ‘cradle to cradle’ approaches to 
product life cycles (Gregson et al., 2015), in which the use of primary resources is minimised, 
any wastes are collected rather than disposed of and, as far as possible, re-used in some way. 
A key proponent of the circular economy concept, the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (EMF) has 
defined the circular economy, stating that it should be “restorative and regenerative by design. 
Relying on system-wide innovation, it aims to redefine products and services to design waste 
out, while minimising negative impacts” (EMF, 2017). 
 
In 2012, the European Commission (EC) adopted a manifesto on the circular economy. Based 
in part on the EMF’s advocacy, the document’s signatories aimed to commit the EU to 
developing a ‘regenerative circular economy’ (EC, 2012). To deliver a transition towards a 
circular economy, the Commission has been developing a series of measures – some 
involving legislation, some not – collectively referred to as ‘the Circular Economy Package – 
which signals a further impetus for improving waste collection rates, closing industrial cycles 
and restricting exports beyond the EU’s borders (Kama, 2015). The proposals include targets 
to increase municipal recycling to 70% by 2030 and limit landfilling to 5% of municipal waste 
(EC, 2015, EP, 2017, Moore, 2017c). In addition, targets have been set for the recycling/re-
use of packaging waste, with a raft of measures to foster better waste collection, preparation 
for re-use and prevention. The use of economic instruments such as pay-as-you-throw 
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schemes and taxes or levies on landfilling and incineration is promoted. Referring back to the 
discussion in Section 2.3, the goals could be regarded as ecologically driven. 
 
The Circular Economy Package now only requires a common text to be agreed with the EU 
Council before it becomes law (Rosa, 2017). If adopted by the UK before the Brexit process 
is complete, the Package could significantly configure domestic policy for waste and resource 
management into the medium term. However, the proposals are meeting some resistance 
among member states in the Council (Moore, 2017b), and the UK waste and resources actors 
interviewed are currently contesting what will and should happen to the Circular Economy 
Package. 
 
A further environmental narrative gathering momentum in the UK at the same time as the 
Brexit process surrounds food waste. Here, the public are often regarded as significant 
producers of waste (Dick et al., 2016), and statistics about the scale of the problem are a key 
element, viz. nearly 20% of the food that UK households purchase is thrown away; and of the 
4.6m tonnes of food waste collected by local authorities each year only 12% is recycled (Dick 
et al., 2016). Typically, food waste is now portrayed as a lost resource: “Recycling … food 
waste, either by anaerobic digestion or by composting represents the most sustainable way 
of extracting value … In so doing, the food waste recycling industry delivers significant 
economic and environmental benefits to UK plc” (Georgeson in Dick et al., 2016, 3). Like the 
circular economy, reducing and recycling food waste is seen as mutually beneficial for the 
environment and the economy, as well as local government and the private sector. 
 
 
Market-led Narratives for Deregulation 
 
There is a set of narratives already circulating in the UK, arguing in various ways that ‘the 
market’ should be given freer reign, that seem well-placed to exploit the ‘policy window’ 
(Kingdon, 2003) created by Brexit. 
 
Politically, Brexit can be seen as a victory for free market proponents, in the desire to cut 
regulation on business and more widely deregulate the economy. Such arguments were 
already resurgent prior to the EU referendum, at EU as well as UK level (Gravey and Jordan, 
2016). Within the UK, EU legislation had been targeted by various ‘Red Tape Reviews’, with 
‘red tape’ often taken to imply environmental regulation. However, although such general calls 
for deregulation continue to attract headlines as the Brexit process begins (Rayner and Hope, 
2017), their traction is unclear, in general and around waste in particular. In the waste sector, 
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pro-market narratives have been deployed at a number of points to argue against government 
bureaucracy or ‘red tape’ (Davies, 2007). However, industry actors questioned the ability of 
this approach to transform the fortunes of the sector (Interview, Lobbyist, 17.3.17), not least 
because – as above – waste markets are constituted by regulation. 
 
What has become more apparent in the wake of the EU referendum is the emergence and 
crystallising of narratives that are critical of the EU Circular Economy Package. These have a 
number of features: identifying Brexit as an opportunity for ‘fresh thinking’ or ‘home grown’ 
policy solutions for waste in the UK; arguing that increased recycling rates are ‘unachievable’, 
excessively costly or inappropriately based on weight; that the Circular Economy package fails 
to recognise the ‘reality of the market’, especially in terms of the limited marketability of 
(especially low quality) recyclates, and that policy has been driven too much by ‘environmental 
agendas’ and alternative approaches would better support economic competitiveness and 
productivity. Elements of these narratives have been propounded by some industry actors 
(FCC, 2016, FCC, 2017, Pennon, 2017, Baddeley and Vergunst, 2016, Taylor, 2017, 
Interview, Listed Company 2, 24.3.17), government ministers (Date, 2016), local government 
(Bird, 2017) and think tanks (Howard and Galloway, 2017). 
 
However, proponents of such narratives often still support circular economy principles, but 
advance different ways in which UK interests could extract economic value from waste 
(Baddeley and Vergunst, 2016). Moreover, waste sector proponents of market-led narratives 
are not necessarily calling for deregulation but for clarity, vision and strategy at a time of 
distinct economic uncertainty, not least to firm up the context for investment. 
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4.0 Analysis: Post-Brexit Waste and Resources Policy Scenarios 
 
4.1 In the short-term 
 
With the Prime Minister triggering Article 50 on 29th March, 2017, over the ensuing years the 
Brexit process and its implications for waste and the environment are likely to be affected by 
a number of intersecting developments.  
 
First, there is the progress of the Great Repeal Bill (now retitled the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill). In theory this legislation will bring all EU legislation and associated 
provisions into UK law at the moment that the UK leaves the EU. Moreover, Government 
ministers are keen to stress that the Bill will be policy neutral, facilitating transposition without 
adjusting substance. However, not all EU provisions can be straightforwardly transposed and 
there are tensions around the possible extension of Ministerial powers, with particular 
uncertainties around what will happen where aspects of policy had previously been devolved, 
as in waste (HoL-EUC, 2017). 
 
Secondly, there is the direction of the EU exit negotiations themselves. The UK has thus far 
been advancing a position that entails regaining control of EU migration and, concomitantly, 
not pursuing membership of the EEA and Customs Union. Assuming this is the outcome, then 
the position is that the UK will no longer be bound by EU rules on waste once it has left the 
EU. Few commentators expect that waste policy, or environmental governance generally, will 
feature prominently in these discussions, though there is the potential – as yet untested - for 
compliance with EU policies to be part of some wider agreed arrangements.  
 
The third important development for waste policy over the period 2017-2019 is the parallel 
progress of the EU’s Circular Economy Package of new legislation and other measures. 
Commentators disagree on whether this will be both completed and passed before the UK 
completes the Brexit process (Ogleby and Mace, 2017, Ogleby, 2017). There is also 
uncertainty as to whether the contents of the Circular Economy Package will be transposed 
into UK law, perhaps because it is automatically swept up in the Repeal Bill process, or 
whether the UK government will act to ensure that it does not have to implement this 
legislation. 
 
In addition to the above, there is the question of how environment and waste issues feature in 
any trade agreements that might be developed (if not finalised or implemented) in parallel with 
the Brexit process. 
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The above four developments focus essentially on regulatory matters, but cutting across them 
is the question of how will the Brexit process affect the economy? There could be further 
effects on sterling, the lending environment and GDP, which feeds into the volumes of 
materials to be handled, capital and labour costs, and the scope to raise funds for investment. 
Uncertainty is an issue in itself, hence the desire by the sector for clear government strategy 
on waste and resources. For business actors in the waste sector, these economic issues are 
arguably more important than the minutiae of Brexit negotiations themselves. 
 
Given the uncertainties above, predicting the future direction of policy is regarded by many in 
the waste sector as an impossible exercise. Thus the scenarios below are not offered as 
predictions but ways of thinking about the prospects for change, about the different dimensions 
of change – legislative, territorial and substantive – and the factors that could pull things in 
different directions. As discussed above, given the different actors in play the future direction 
of policy is likely to be contested. Moreover, rather than focusing on change alone, it is equally 
important to consider the powerful forces for continuity that might ‘lock-in’ the organisation of 
waste to particular governance and management approaches. 
 
 
4.2 Scenario A –Tracking the EU 
 
This scenario assumes that waste and resources policy in the UK continues closely to track 
that of the EU, including the various elements of the Circular Economy Package. In this 
scenario, EU targets still apply, reinforcing continued downward pressure on disposal of waste 
to landfill, to be achieved via greater recycling and resource recovery. For the UK, circular 
economy principles thus continue to apply predominantly at European scale – i.e. waste and 
waste-derived resources circulate within a space defined mainly by EU member states and 
EU regulations. 
 
This scenario could arise for essentially legal reasons – because the Brexit deal agreed with 
the EU requires elements of the Circular Economy package to be met or because the package 
is passed in time for its legislative elements to be brought into UK law - but also because of 
other factors tending to reinforce alignment with the EU. 
 
One element is trade and its connections with industrial policy. Even outside the EU, the UK 
may continue to need to comply with EU norms for elements of waste management applying 
to materials and products that are traded with EU, e.g. provisions for minimum recycled 
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content in certain products. Discussions in other policy spheres such as energy suggests that 
there may be scope for the EU to require compliance with substantive targets (i.e. recycling 
targets) in order to access EU markets,4 depending on the political negotiations that unfold. 
 
There is also the possibility that key governmental and industry actors come to agree that full 
participation in a circular economy constructed at EU territorial scale offers the greatest 
efficiencies and market opportunities. Moreover, alignment with EU policy and regulation could 
also facilitate investment by conferring institutional consistency and stability on the UK waste 
and resource economy into the medium term, and compensate to a degree for an absence of 
clarity from UK government waste strategy. The policy drivers for greater landfill diversion, for 
decentralised energy and associated opportunities means that some companies’ current 
business case remains secure (Interview, Listed Company 2, 24.3.17).  
 
Ongoing alignment with EU waste policy would, however, be associated with a number of 
tensions, e.g.: 
 
 In governance terms, as the UK is no longer an EU member it would have little say in how 
policy and associated regulations develop, which may therefore become less 
accommodating of UK interests and the kinds of material that the UK is able to produce. 
The quality of recyclates exported from England has already been found inadequate by 
customers abroad (Gregson et al., 2015). 
 Critics of the Circular Economy Package would point to the prospective costs of upping 
recycling targets in a market context where primary materials – especially plastics – have 
become cheaper. Difficult questions thus arise as to the economic viability of meeting 
these targets and on whom the costs should fall, especially in a context of ongoing 
austerity among local authorities (Interview, Analyst, 10.3.17). 
 
 
4.3 Scenario B – Flatlining, fragmentation and regression 
 
In effect, Scenario B reflects a broad fear of environmental organisations that the UK’s exit 
from the EU would presage an era of limited and declining ambition in UK environmental policy 
(HoC-EAC, 2017) and applies it to waste. It assumes that the policy for waste and resource 
management in the UK ceases to be aligned with the EU and performance fails to register 
                                                          
4 The analogue here is the Single Energy Market, where there are concerns that if the UK defaults on 
EU renewable energy targets then this may affect its ability to trade electricity (Shankleman, 2017). 
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further environmental improvements in the years after Brexit. This may entail that policy 
becomes more fragmented and accommodating of disposal routes lower on the waste 
hierarchy. 
 
A number of factors would reinforce Scenario B. Key government figures might seek to use 
Brexit as an opportunity to cut regulation, and this chimes with critics within the waste sector 
that the Circular Economy Package measures are expensive, and should be ignored in favour 
of ‘home grown’ solutions. Agendas of extended producer responsibility for waste are viewed 
as a potential cost on business or – even if viewed positively – as something where a pro-
deregulation government does not seek ‘interfere’ by legal measures. Action on waste by 
manufacturers, retailers and other businesses thus becomes more dependent on whether 
individual companies see it as economically efficient, factoring in their concerns about image, 
corporate social responsibility and stakeholder pressure. Overall, in Scenario B the 
judgements of commercial actors are given significant scope to shape the means and ends of 
waste management policy, allowing some to take low cost, short-termist views. In terms of 
governance style, a drift towards voluntaristic and flexible policy approaches post-Brexit would 
be consistent with long-standing UK policy-making traditions favouring discretion and markets 
over fixed targets and standards. 
 
NGOs see food waste as an area where there is a risk that such voluntarism comes to prevail 
in the UK, at least in England (Interview, NGO 2, 15.3.17). The policy rhetoric will be that any 
goals can be met more efficiently through (largely) voluntary means, from producers and 
consumers and that legally binding measures are not therefore required. The reality is that 
corporate action on food waste will remain highly inconsistent (HoC-EFRAC, 2017), as will 
progress with producer responsibility more widely. 
 
A further reinforcing factor for Scenario B is that flatlining is the scenario most consistent with 
a future in which there continues to be limited Westminster government interest in or policy-
making capacity for waste, allowing sustained marginalisation of the issue (HoL-EUC, 2017, 
Interview, Local Government 1, 3.3.17)). Governments do not seek overtly to dismantle 
existing waste policy but attrition occurs by default, due to other economic priorities dominating 
attention and weak implementation; EU funding for waste-related policy initiatives disappears 
without replacement (Interview, Legal Expert, 16.3.17, HoC-EFRAC, 2017). Waste and 
resources already scarcely receive a mention in the industrial strategy (BEIS, 2017). Central 
government responsibility may be abnegated by dumping more responsibility onto local 
government i.e. localist rhetoric is used to abandon or downgrade waste 
management/landfill/recycling targets for local authorities, giving them the ‘freedom’ to decide 
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what to do but without additional resources or powers. Waste policy has, after all, been subject 
to populist, anti-environmental measures in the past (Guardian, 2015; Interview, Welsh 
Government 1, 17.3.17). 
 
Failure to promote producer responsibility or support behaviour change shifts the costs 
elsewhere, and local waste management practices in England are already at risk of 
deterioration, with budgetary pressures a key factor (Interview, Welsh Local Government 1, 
16.3.17). Recycling rates in England fell from 2014 to 2015 and have been more or less static 
since 2012. In the context of austerity, and with budgetary and public pressure on adult social 
care, some local authorities have already become reluctant to invest in further recycling 
facilities, sought to reduce recycling services (e.g. dropping separated plastic waste collection 
and not implementing food waste collection; Interview, Lobbyist, 17.03.17; Interview, Sector 
Analyst, 10.3.17), and reduce engagement in educating publics and enforcing fly tipping 
regulations (Interview, NGO2, 15.3.17). Any relaxation of EU-derived recycling targets may 
entrench this situation (Interview, NGO2, 15.03.17), especially if moves towards producer 
responsibility also falter, thus exerting little downward pressure on the volumes or complexity 
of waste ending up in municipal disposal streams.  
 
A number of issues push against Scenario B, however: 
 For all the libertarian rhetoric of ‘cut red tape’, the waste sector has emerged from two UK 
red tape reviews more or less unscathed, and waste-related policy does not seem to be 
first in lobbyists’ firing line (Rayner and Hope, 2017). 
 Pressure for international regulatory consistency to facilitate markets in waste and waste-
derived materials may counter deregulatory actions. EU regulations that pertain to traded 
goods and materials including waste will still be highly influential, given the (presumed) 
desirability of exporting things like RDF to the EU. Industry respondents believe that the 
standards that drive these exports will largely remain in place because of the majority of 
pre-existing UK legislation and the Basel Convention (Interview, Listed Company 2, 
24.3.17, Interview, Sustainability Consultant 3, 22.3.17). Also, multinational waste and 
resources companies may want to avoid ceding a competitive advantage to those 
companies working to higher standards (Interview, Sustainability Consultant 2, 16.3.17, 
Interview, Legal Expert, 16.3.17). 
 The Government has used a broad narrative of the post-Brexit UK becoming a ‘Great 
trading nation’ and thereby seeking trading opportunities with countries outside EU. In this 
scenario it may be believed that lowering standards to those demanded by markets 
outside EU is worth the possible loss of waste-related markets inside the EU (Ogleby and 
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Mace, 2017, NGO 2, 15.3.17, Sustainability Consultant 2, 16.3.17), especially as the 
generally low-value, co-mingled recyclates that the UK produces tend to be more reliant 
on global markets (Gregson et al., 2015, Listed Company 1, 15.3.17, Analyst, 10.3.17). 
However, seeking to exploit markets for recyclates and RDF outside the EU still means 
meeting materials standards (Moore, 2017a), with a growing number of Chinese plants 
now meeting international standards for resource recovery (Gregson et al., 2015). 
 It is unlikely that waste governance in the UK will see any slide ‘down’ the waste hierarchy, 
to an increasing use of landfill. None of our interviewees thought this likely, because 
recycling at present levels makes sense economically for many local authorities; multi-
national waste companies do not develop new landfills abroad, in Europe, so would be 
unlikely to develop them here; and the planning difficulties of siting new landfills make 
such investment difficult. 
 
If major return to landfill is unlikely, more conceivable within Scenario B is that the UK sees 
further moves towards incineration of waste though energy-from-waste plants, even as the 
European Commission becomes increasingly sceptical of this disposal route. Actors in the 
waste sector seem to think this is where economic opportunity lies. Faltering domestic 
recycling in England would be one driver, with incineration seen as a less demanding way of 
avoiding landfill than struggling to produce higher quality recyclates (Gregson et al., 2015, 
McGlone, 2017). It would be reinforced in the short-term by business desires to secure returns 
on extant investments in incineration and associated contracts. If a post-Brexit trade situation 
makes waste exports more difficult, this too might be used to underpin arguments for 
incineration as a low cost solution (McGlone, 2017). It would be assisted further by a UK 
government infrastructure strategy that takes to further steps to help expedite planning 
consents for incineration-based waste handling facilities, a move that would be consistent with 
the wider trends around infrastructure planning (Marshall and Cowell, 2016). Tellingly: 
 
“In the majority of our business, I’d probably argue that Brexit has reduced the 
uncertainty … Because we’re now not expecting to implement the circular economy 
package, and we’re therefore expecting the Government to not push recycling massively 
… within the next investment cycle. And … we’ve seen … [the] National Infrastructure 
Commission trying to embed our sector within industry, which is a positive for us.” 
(Interview, Listed Company 1, 15.3.17) 
 
The economic viability of incineration is further enhanced to the extent that companies and 
government facilitate greater exploitation of the energy generation potential, primarily 
electricity, in an energy system in which such dispatchable power sources represent a 
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valuable adjunct to intermittent renewables. This is seen as a relatively low risk option for 
major waste companies (Interview, Listed Company 1, 15.3.17). 
 
Overall, Scenario B is less a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of environmental standards, but a 
world in which the UK becomes increasingly ‘locked in’ to disposal routes – incineration with 
energy recovery – on the second rung of the hierarchy (as seen elsewhere; Corvellec et al., 
2013). 
 
 
4.4 Scenario C – Diverse Green Shoots 
 
In this scenario, Brexit becomes an opportunity for pursuing waste and resources policies that 
achieve significant improvements, pushing UK policy approaches further ‘up’ the waste 
hierarchy towards re-use and elimination at source, and doing so above and beyond what the 
EU-level action looks likely to achieve. As a scenario it is the most difficult to sketch from the 
evidence available as it is not an extrapolation of existing tendencies. For many environmental 
commentators, adopting the EU Circular Economy Package of measures constituted the main 
pathway for more environmentally-driven goals. For others, optimism comes from beliefs 
about where voluntary market action by corporations will take us. Overall, however, our 
interviewees rarely spontaneously presented ways in which Brexit would lead towards more 
sustainable UK policy; such silence itself speaks volumes. This reflects the fact that it is far 
from clear that EU membership debarred the UK from going further with its waste and 
resources strategy. Whereas in other policy sectors there has been sustained criticism of the 
environmental performance of EU policy (e.g. agriculture; Burns et al., 2016), in the sphere of 
waste it has only been the EU’s use of simplistic, weight-based targets that is identified as 
having problematic environmental consequences (Interview, Listed Company 2, 24.3.17). 
Arguments levelled against EU action in the waste sphere have been mostly economic, not 
environmental. 
 
Three sets of actions might be forces for improvement: narratives of national resource security; 
public pressure; action by the devolved governments. We examine each in turn. 
 
One possibility is that Brexit becomes a vehicle for more intensive efforts at waste reduction 
and careful extraction of the resource content of waste streams within the territory of the UK. 
In effect, a circular economy becomes more firmly established at the national rather than 
European scale. This agenda might develop through the mobilisation of‘re-shoring’ narratives 
in policy debates amplified by the representation of resource access as an issue of national 
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security and competitiveness. This narrative has its advocates in the waste industry (McGlone, 
2017, Messenger, 2016), and might dovetail with greater collaboration between local 
authorities to exercise greater control over waste markets (Interview Local Government 1, 
3.3.17). Such agendas could draw reinforcement from any emerging problems around trading 
waste-derived resources as the UK leaves the EU. 
 
A number of elements work against the promotion of national resource security arguments. 
Whatever the potential overall economic gains, there remains the political challenge of 
instituting policies that will have redistributive consequences for different sectors of the 
economy – some will profit, others may see it as a cost – in a climate where short-term growth 
pressures may prevail. There are uncertainties about how moves towards a UK-scale circular 
economy based on high levels of resource and value recovery can be realised in the context 
of trade deals with other countries, and where the standards adopted by the EU can be 
expected to continue to exert influence. It has, after all, been the Government’s mantra to 
‘make Britain a global leader in free trade’ (BEIS, 2017, 80, emphasis added), and resource 
autarky is in tension with this. Moreover, even if the policy environment favours greater intra-
UK treatment of waste, this does not automatically favour solutions at the top of the waste 
hierarchy, they could equally favour domestic energy recovery (McGlone, 2017). 
 
Whatever happens with the UK’s EU exit negotiations, one should expect NGO, media and 
public pressure to put waste related issues under the spotlight and push for policy progress. 
One example would be the concerns around plastic wastes, especially their effects on marine 
environments, and the emerging interest in plastic bottle deposit refund schemes, which 
achieved widespread support across the political parties in the 2017 general election.    In 
addition, contradictions in existing policy arrangements create continuous pressures to search 
for domestic solutions, such as extending producer responsibility for wastes to reduce volumes 
arriving with local authorities to address. 
 
However, while leaving the EU can be represented as an ‘opportunity’ for organisations to 
campaign for policy improvements, it is far from clear why Brexit should automatically generate 
such outcomes. It remains to be seen whether the political climate has become markedly more 
receptive. An additional factor here is that since 2010 there has been a significant reduction 
in the availability of informed opinion for policy makers, with the abolition of the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution and Sustainable Development Commission. Policy 
made in response to public pressure alone is unlikely to be comprehensive. 
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Given the actions already taken by the devolved governments on waste, one might view 
devolution as a force for driving forward more ambitious environmental goals, though the 
issues vary between the territories. In Northern Ireland, concerns around Brexit are very much 
shaped by the future form of the border with the Irish Republic, which could have profound 
effects on movements of waste north and south, legal and illegal. 
 
Wales raises interesting questions about the multi-level politics of prospective waste policy 
improvements. The Welsh Government has achieved higher targets for recycling than 
England, and has been proposing further targets that exceed those of the EU’s circular 
economy package (Interviews, Welsh Government 1, 17.3.17, and 2, 21.3.17). Both Wales 
and Scotland have been assertive about pursuing circular economy approaches and collecting 
higher quality recyclates for local and wider economic re-use. Corporate actors are also 
positive about the clarity of long-term direction the devolved governments have created 
(Interviews, Listed Company 2, 24.3.17; Lobbyist, 17.3.17, Sustainability Consultant 1, 
13.3.17, Legal Expert, 16.3.17). 
 
Looking at Wales in particular, the view of interviewees was that Brexit is not expected to have 
an adverse effect on Welsh waste and resources policy agendas. Given the significant 
devolution of powers in this sphere Wales has set its own waste legislation underpinning things 
like statutory recycling targets, which is independent of Europe. This affords a degree of 
insulation from the legislative fall-out of Brexit (e.g. Interview, Welsh NGO 1, 10.03.17). 
Moreover, interviewees felt that current policy should be expected to persist because the 
pursuit of ‘zero waste’ had won the arguments that it is environmentally, socially and 
economically the right thing to do, and was supported politically. As one interviewee put it, for 
Wales: 
“My biggest concern is working out how we … reach the standards that the future 
requires regardless of Brexit … I think, I think with a bit of vision, Wales could 
say…‘Brexit, who cares?’ … [We should] talk to people like the waste producers and 
say, regardless of Brexit and regardless of government policy, how can we work in a 
way that allows you and us to thrive and take more waste out?” (Interview, Sustainability 
Consultant 1, 16.3.17; see also Interviews, Lobbyist, 17.3.17, Statutory Agency and 
Local Government 1, 13.3.17). 
The bigger risks to further environmental progress came not directly from Brexit but from 
austerity, reducing funding at devolved and local government level, and via the effects of Brexit 
on Westminster policy-making (Interviews, Welsh Government 2, 21.3.17, Welsh NGO1, 
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10.03.17). Even though waste policy and legislation is very substantially devolved, actors in 
Wales recognised that Westminster could stymie progress outside England in a number of 
ways: 
 
 Westminster was seen to have given little interest to waste and to be more ‘hands off’ and 
open to deregulatory pressures (Interview, Welsh NGO1, 10.03.17), creating something 
of an ideological gulf with the Welsh Government’s more interventionist approach. 
 The devolved governments were felt to have less influence through the various routes for 
intergovernmental coordination than business, such that ‘the industry will always win the 
lobbying with Westminster (Interview, Welsh Local Government 1, 16.3.17). 
 Whether or not the Repeal Bill removes powers from the devolved governments (as 
discussed in Hunt, 2017), Westminster still controls levers that are vital in pushing towards 
zero waste, in the spheres of product standards and packaging. Westminster inactivity 
here makes it much more difficult for the devolved governments to push ambitious 
agendas for recycling and re-use. As noted earlier, the policy dynamics may be different 
for the more mobile, tradable components of waste circuits. 
 There are also the effects that Westminster exerts on budgets for devolved governments, 
which is important given that waste policy improvements in Wales have been achieved 
by investing more public resources (for example, for the roll out of separate weekly food 
waste collections; Interviews, Analysts 10.03.17). 
 There is also the issue of scale. Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland represent only a 
small proportion of UK wastes compared to England, diminishing the leverage they can 
exert on commercial agendas and regulatory design. In arguments about policy and 
regulatory consistency within UK territory, or in relation to waste and resource trade, the 
industry may push successfully for arguments against divergence (Interview, Analyst, 
10.03.17, Cowell, 2017). 
 
There is a wider issue here. If cross-UK policy consistency is desirable, with which part of the 
UK should any national approach be aligned? There have been some instances of positive 
interactions between actions in the devolved territories on waste and wider policy change in 
the past. Interviewees attest that devolution has served as ‘policy laboratory’ for new 
technologies and schemes around waste, enabling new approaches to be tested and 
demonstrated and thus making it easier to then roll them out across the UK (Interviews, 
Sustainability Consultant 3, 22.3.17; Listed Company 1, 15.3.17). The tax on carrier bags 
applied through retailers, first introduced across Wales, is held up as an example; universal 
roll out of food waste collection (Rees, 2017) may yet prove to be another. Whether devolved 
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governments become a force for driving progress across the UK in the future post-Brexit will 
depend very much on the quality of any governance arrangements put in place for 
intergovernmental coordination (Interviews Welsh Government 1, 17.3.17; Welsh Local 
Government 1, 16.3.17), and the receptiveness of Westminster to ideas around eco-efficient 
or ecological goals, and to creating UK-scale circular economies. It may also depend on new 
dynamics of lobbying, linking devolved governments and national NGOs. 
 
 
4.5 Enforcement 
 
For many people working in the waste and resources sector, enforcement is a fundamental 
issue. One reason that it has not been given more attention thus far in this briefing report is 
that the connections to Brexit are not always clear, and enforcement concerns would seem to 
apply equally to any future scenario. This is very much the case with the fly tipping, for which 
the scope to design and implement enforcement mechanisms remains essentially in the gift 
of UK governments. However, there are three points of connection. 
 
The first, mentioned above, concerns the nature of the border between the Irish Republic and 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Secondly, and with more pervasive effects, should the UK leave the EEA as well as the EU, 
and thus the purview of the CJEU, then that removes a significant mechanism by which the 
UK government can be held to account for failing to comply with policy, e.g. recycling targets. 
For pro-leave advocates, this is a good thing, but there is considerable disquiet about this 
situation from opposition political parties and environmental groups (HoL-EUC, 2017, 
Interview, Lobbyist, 17.3.17; Sustainability Consultant 3, 22.3.17). The threat of infraction 
proceedings and fines from the EU has been an important force for domestic UK action in the 
past. This is quite separate from whether the Repeal Bill will leave a series of regulatory holes. 
 
Thirdly, when it comes to issues around fly-tipping and other forms of illegal disposal the 
issues are somewhat different. Will dealing with Brexit reinforce the kind of political inattention 
and public sector austerity that means that enforcement gets little attention or funding? 
(Interview, Legal Expert, 16.3.17). If the solution is tighter regulation of the licensing of waste 
handlers (ESA, 2017), then this will need reconciling with political agendas that see Brexit as 
an opportunity for further lightening the touch of regulation. 
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5.0 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this briefing has been to spark debate about the direction of UK waste and 
resources policy post-Brexit, and to provide some frameworks for reflecting about the potential 
future pathways that might emerge. In so doing, it has sought to widen reflection beyond the 
simplistic categories of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Brexit, and to extend analysis beyond the legal 
dimensions of what might change and what might be permissible. It has emphasised the 
multiple dimensions of change, by placing legislative issues alongside issues of substantive 
direction and territorial concerns. It has drawn on documentary and interview data with 
informed respondents from the waste and resources field. And in addition it has pressed the 
argument that Brexit is not just about change but thinking carefully about whether the present 
is likely to persist, or should do so. Out of this it has created three scenarios – ‘tracking the 
EU’, ‘Flatlining, fragmentation and regression’ and ‘Diverse green shoots’ - which characterise 
three broad pathways into the future. 
 
But scenarios are not predictions and the very nature of the Brexit process makes prediction 
hazardous. We recognise that there may be future scenarios that combine the elements we 
identified in different ways, and elements no one has yet predicted. There are also new 
narratives that might gain traction, such as ‘re-shoring resources for economic security’, yet 
they could be attached to different substantive goals. We also recognise that it is hard to 
remain morally neutral in what is a highly contested and politicised field. Put simply, what we 
treat as ‘progress’ may be seen by some as undesirable. We would very much welcome 
feedback on our scenarios and arguments (sent to the email address below). 
 
In the process of developing this briefing it has become clear that thinking about future waste 
and resources policy for the UK, as the nation becomes subject to less compulsion to comply 
with EU legislation, ought to bring more fundamental questions to centre stage: 
 
1) What is the importance of regulation? 
EU membership has coincided with and to some extent reinforced political and business 
narratives that are pejorative about regulation. As we leave the EU, and it becomes less 
possible to equate ‘regulation’ with ‘outside interference’, so this should spark careful 
assessment of the proper role of regulation in defining a direction of travel for the environment 
and the economy. The waste and resources sector is a prime policy field for this to take place, 
as it exemplifies a sector where environmental regulation both creates and restricts economic 
opportunity, and where regulation is integral to the construction of trading policy. Such 
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assessments may well question the notion that the UK as a ‘great trading nation’ is also, in 
some simplistic fashion, a ‘beacon for free trade’. 
 
2) Where does voluntary action by business get us and where does it not? 
A post-Brexit UK may well be a world in which there is greater reliance on voluntary business 
action, especially in spheres like producer responsibility and food waste. It seems timely 
therefore to think very carefully about the levels of improvement that this is likely to be achieve, 
unaided. It has been long known that solutions to environmental problems that are ecologically 
sustainable are not automatically the same as those which are economically efficient to 
business actors (Pearce, 1976); it is a good time to bring this discussion centre stage. 
 
3) Territorial coordination – but with whom? 
Waste and resources policy shows very clearly that the ‘what’ of future policy (what standards, 
targets and procedures should we pursue?) cannot be separated from the issue of territorial 
scale (who decides, and for whom?). Alongside the issue of the extent to which UK policy 
should track the EU are concerns about global and sub-national scale, both of which raise 
further tensions. Looking beyond the UK, and narratives of the country becoming a ‘Great 
Trading Nation’, there are tensions between agendas that foster increased openness of the 
UK economy, where materials chase profit, and those promoting ‘national (or local) resource 
circularity in the economy. Brexit also raises profound questions about intra-UK policy 
coordination once the framework of EU policy is removed (Jordan and Gravey, 2017). How 
can UK inter-government institutions work to view the devolved nations as laboratories of 
waste policy innovation that improve UK approaches, rather than creators of policy 
inconsistencies that should be ironed out to level the intra-UK level playing field? 
Feedback email address: cowellrj@cardiff.ac.uk 
  
29 
 
References 
BADDELEY, A. & VERGUNST, T. 2016. A Resourceful Future – Expanding the UK Economy. Bristol: 
Eunomia. 
BEIS 2017. Building our Industrial Strategy - Green Paper. London: Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy. 
BIRD, S. 2017. Look beyond recycling rates for true waste reduction. ENDS Report, April. 
BULKELEY, H., WATSON, M., HUDSON, R. & WEAVER, P. 2005. Governing municipal waste: 
towards a new analytical framework. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 7, 1-23. 
BURNS, C., JORDAN, A., GRAVEY, V., BERNY, N., BULMER, S., CARTER, N., COWELL, R., 
DUTTON, J., MOORE, B., OBERTHÜR, S., OWENS, S., RAYNER, T., SCOTT, J. & 
STEWART, B. 2016. The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: An Expert Review. How 
has EU membership affected the UK and what might change in the event of a vote to Remain 
or Leave? 
CORVELLEC, H., CAMPOS, M. J. Z. & ZAPATA, P. 2013. Infrastructures, lock-in, and sustainable 
urban development: the case of waste incineration in the Göteborg Metropolitan Area. Journal 
of Cleaner Production, 50, 32-39. 
COWELL, R. 2017. The EU referendum, planning and the environment: where now for the UK? Town 
Planning Review, 88, 153-171. 
CUP 2017. Forward, Together. Our plan for a Stronger Britain and Prosperous Future. London: 
Conservative and Unionist Party. 
DATE, W. 2016. Coffey: EU recycling target ‘too high’. Letsrecycle.com, 12th October. 
DAVIES, S. 2007. Politics and markets: The case of UK municipal waste management. Cardiff: 
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. 
DEFRA 2011. Environmental permitting guidance: The landfill directive. London: Department for 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs. 
DEFRA 2013. Waste Management Plan for England. London: Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs. 
DICK, H., HENNIG, A. & SCHOLES, P. 2016. Comparing the cost of alternative waste treatment 
options - Gate Fees report 2016. Banbury: WRAP. 
EC 1975. Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on Waste. Brussels: European Council. 
EC 1999. Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the Landfill of Waste. Brussels: European 
Council. 
EC 2008. Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
on waste and repealing certain Directives Brussels: European Council. 
EC 2012. Manifesto For A Resource-Efficient Europe. Brussels: European Commission. 
EC 2015. Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions - Towards a 
circular economy: A zero waste programme for Europe. Brussels: European Commission. 
EMF. 2017. What is a Circular Economy? [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-economy [Accessed 20th July, 2017]. 
EP 2017. Circular economy package - Four legislative proposals on waste. Brussels: European 
Parliament. 
ESA 2017. Planning for a Circular Economy. London: Environmental Services Association. 
FCC 2016. FCC Environment Group Chief Executive Paul Taylor discusses maximising the value of 
waste amid worrying reports Northampton: FCC Environment. 
FCC 2017. EU Waste diktat could cost Britain £2 billion. Northampton: FCC Environment. 
FILGUERIA, B. 2016. Brexit and environmental law in the UK. Available from: http://www.eric-
group.co.uk/brexit/brexit-and-environmental-law-in-the-uk. 
GEE, G. & YOUNG, A. L. 2016. Regaining Sovereignty? Brexit, the UK Parliament and the Common 
Law. European Public Law, 22, 131-147. 
GRAVEY, V. & JORDAN, A. 2016. Does the European Union have a reverse gear? Policy dismantling 
in a hyperconsensual polity. Journal of European Public Policy, 23, 1180-1198. 
GREGSON, N., CRANG, M., FULLER, S. & HOLMES, H. 2015. Interrogating the circular economy: 
the moral economy of resource recovery in the EU. Economy and Society, 44, 218-243. 
GUARDIAN. 2015. Tory pledge to restore weekly bin collections to be dropped. 7th September. 
HOC-EAC 2017. The Future of the Natural Environment after the EU Referendum. London: House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee. 
HOC-EFRAC 2017. Food Waste in England. London: House of Commons Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs Committee. 
30 
 
HOL-EUC 2017. Brexit: environment and climate change. London: House of Lords European Union 
Committee. 
HOLDER, M. 2016. Demand for UK RDF 'would continue' in event of Brexit. Lets Recycle Online 
News. 
HOWARD, R. & GALLOWAY, T. 2017. Going Round in Circles: Developing a new approach to waste 
policy following Brexit. London: Policy Exchange. 
HUNT, J. 2017. The repatriation of competences. EU referendum: one year on. London: Political 
Studies Association / Kings College London. 
HUNT, J., MINTO, R. & WOOLFORD, J. 2016. Winners and losers: the EU Referendum vote and its 
consequences for Wales. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 12, 824-834. 
JENNINGS, P. 2016. CIWM responds to the EU referendum result. Northampton: Chartered Institute 
of Wastes Management. 
JORDAN, A. & GRAVEY, V. 2017. The Brexit election. Red, white blue … and green? . The 
Environmentalist. Lincoln: Institute of Environmental Management & Assessment. 
KAMA, K. 2015. Circling the economy: resource‐making and marketization in EU electronic waste 
policy. Area, 47, 16-23. 
KINGDON, J. W. 2003. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston, Little Brown. 
MACRORY, R. B. 2017. Brexit unlikely to give UK free rein over green laws. ENDS Report 
Twickenham: Haymarket Group. 
MARSHALL, T. & COWELL, R. 2016. Infrastructure, planning and the command of time. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy, 34, 1843-1866. 
MAURICI, J. & MOULES, R. 2014. The influence of the Aarhus Convention on EU Environmental 
Law: Part 2. Journal of Planning and Environment Law, 2, 181-202. 
MCGLONE, C. 2017. Rise of the incinerators? ENDS Report. Twickenham: Haymarket Group. 
MESSENGER, B. 2016. Brexit – How the Waste & Recycling Industry Reacted to Referendum Result. 
Waste Management World. Vienna: International Solid Waste Management Association. 
MOORE, D. 2016. Government Publishes Red Tape Review Of Waste Sector. CIWM Journal. 
Northampton: Chartered Institute of Wastes Management. 
MOORE, D. 2017a. Chinese Customs Using X-Ray Machines To Check All Waste Containers. CIWM 
Journal. Northampton: Chartered Institute of Wastes Management. 
MOORE, D. 2017b. EEB accuse member states of "sabotaging" move to circular economy. CIWM 
Journal. Northampton: Chartered Institution for Wastes Management. 
MOORE, D. 2017c. MEPs Vote To Restore Original Circular Economy Package Recycling Targets. 
CIWM Journal. Northampton: Chartered Institute of Wastes Management. 
OGLEBY, G. 2017. CIWM: Circular economy will suffer without Government's helping hand. edie.net. 
East Grinstead: Faversham House Ltd. 
OGLEBY, G. & MACE, G. 2017. Article 50: what we know (and don't know) about the environmental 
impact of Brexit. edie.net. East Grinstead: Faversham House Ltd. 
OPSI 2002. The Landfill (England and Wales) Regulations (SI 2002/1559). London: Office of Public 
Sector Information. 
OPSI 2003. The Landfill (Scotland) Regulations 2003. London: Office of Public Sector Information. 
OPSI 2010. Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations. London: Office of Public 
Sector Information. 
OPSI 2011. The Waste (England and Wales) Regulations 2011. 
OPSI 2012. The Waste (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2012. 
PEARCE, D. 1976. The economics of waste disposal in the UK. Resources Policy, 2, 247-255. 
PENNON 2017. Pennon backs Policy Exchange focus on post-Brexit, bespoke for Britain resource 
policy. Exeter: Pennon Group. 
RAYNER, G. & HOPE, C. 2017. Cut the EU red tape choking Britain after Brexit to set the country 
free from the shackles of Brussels. Daily Telegraph, 27th March. 
REES, A. 2017. How we can learn from the Welsh recycling success story. ENDS Report. 
Twickenham: Haymarket Group. 
RESOURCE. 2017. Recycling: Who really leads the world? Resource, 13th Feruary. 
ROSA, F. 2017. Simona Bonafè drives Europe to a circular economy. Brussels: Zero Waste Europe. 
SEPA 2009. A Guide to Waste Management Licensing. Edinburgh: Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
SHANKLEMAN, J. 2017. UK seeks to abandon green goal that may sour Brexit. Bloomberg, 5th April. 
SIMON, J. M. 2016. Brexit: a bad choice is no excuse for not moving towards zero waste. How will 
Brexit impact Britain’s waste management practices? [Online]. Available from: 
31 
 
http://www.scottish-islands-federation.co.uk/how-will-brexit-impact-britains-waste-
management-practices/ [Accessed March 2nd 2017]. 
SORA, M. J. 2013. Incineration overcapacity and waste shipping in Europe: the end of the proximity 
principle [Online]. Barcelona: Fundació ENT. Available: http://ent.cat/incineration-
overcapacity-and-waste-shipping-in-europe-the-end-of-the-proximity-principle/?lang=en 
[Accessed 20th July 2017]. 
TAYLOR, P. 2017. Brexit could give the waste sector the coherent, long-term framework it 
desperately needs. FCC Environment Blog [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.edie.net/blog/Brexit-could-give-the-waste-sector-the-coherent-long-term-
framework-it-desperately-needs/6098298. 
UNRUH, G. C. 2000. Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy Policy, 28, 817-830. 
WAG 2002. Wise About Waste. Cardiff: Welsh Assembly Government. 
WG 2010. Towards Zero Waste. Cardiff: Welsh Government. 
 
